Centre for Governance Studies, Dhaka

Conclusion & Recommendations

Journalists play a critical role in society. The UN Human Rights Committee, for instance, has explained that “free, uncensored and unhindered press or other media” that is “independent and diverse” “constitutes one of the cornerstones of a democratic society.”328 Similarly, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has stated that “[t]he media play an essential role as vehicles for the exercise of the social dimension of freedom of expression in a democratic society, which is why it is vital that the media are able to gather the most diverse information and opinions.”329 And the European Court of Human Rights has repeatedly emphasized the “vital role of the media in facilitating and fostering the public’s right to receive and impart information and ideas.”330

Yet our data shows that the DSA was readily susceptible of being weaponized against journalists for political purposes as well as for personal rivalries and grievances: There were few barriers to filing a complaint—indeed, in many cases the affected individual was not even the complainant—and repeated complaints were filed in respect of the same speech. The provisions of the law were broad and vague, and invoked interchangeably by officers. In many cases, journalists were arrested in the middle of the night or suffered abuse in detention. Once embroiled in a case, proceedings were, moreover, riddled with delays. The cases caused significant hardship along multiple dimensions.

While the DSA has been repealed, the dangers revealed in this report are not past. Indeed, the succession of cyberlaws in Bangladesh mirrors a trend across South Asia, where speech-restrictive laws are repeatedly tweaked or repackaged, without addressing the need for fundamental reform.331 In Pakistan, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act has been used to target journalists and suppress dissenting speech.332 And India’s Information Technology Act and related rules have been repeatedly amended to censor and control online speech.333 This both shows that the DSA is not an anomaly, but also creates an opportunity for Bangladesh to lead the way in protecting digital rights through the implementation of a further narrowed CSO and other rights-respecting reforms.

Concerningly, as it stands, Section 26 of the CSO carries forward elements of one of the most problematic provisions of the DSA (i.e., Section 31). Section 26 remains highly susceptible to abuse.

This concern is exacerbated by the way in which various provisions of the DSA were clubbed together with little logic, suggesting that the legal lines dividing one offense from another are not especially clear. That is, even if there are now fewer tools available, the availability of one or more may be sufficient where little care is given to distinguishing one offense from another. Further, the weakness of investigations under the DSA bolsters the concern regarding a lack of careful scrutiny by officials.

At the same time, the fact that the CSO is an ordinance creates further uncertainty: If the Parliament does not adopt the CSO when it convenes, the CSO will lapse, restoring the antecedent status quo, including presumably the applicability of the CSA.

Indeed, while recent amendments to the CSO purport to quash certain cases under the DSA and vacate convictions, it remains to be seen how this will be implemented—and in any event, the amendment appears to contemplate the continuation of some cases under the DSA despite there no longer being a legal basis for their pursuit. In addition, the CSO does

freedom/. And yet as Human Rights Watch has explained, 2025 amendments to PECA added new provisions “making the dissemination of ‘fake or false’ information a criminal offense punishable by up to three years in prison.” Human Rights Watch, Pakistan: Repeal Amendment to Draconian Cyber Law, Feb. 3, 2025, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/03/pakistan-repeal-amendment-draconian-cyberlaw.

not speak to ongoing ICT Act cases at all, which could continue to be pursued despite a lack of legal basis.

In light of the above, we offer the following recommendations:

To the Interim Government

i.Take steps to protect freedom of the press, regardless of the political orientation of the journalists in question.

ii. As a matter of transparency, create a public data repository on the implementation of the CSO, including enforcement statistics disaggregated by profession, gender, and location, in order to track whether it is implemented in a manner consistent with international law.

iii. Address cases pending under previous cyber-crime laws:

a) Quash all outstanding cases under the ICT Act, consistent with the principle of legality, and take steps to vacate convictions in parallel with the recent amendment to the CSO regarding speech-related DSA convictions.

b) Quash all outstanding cases under the DSA, consistent with the principle of legality, and ensure that the recent amendment to the CSO vacating convictions under certain provisions of the DSA is effectively implemented.

c) Release a list of all cases pending under the ICT Act, DSA and the CSA and the status of these cases, indicating whether they have been withdrawn or quashed to provide clarity regarding their status. Lessons can be perhaps be drawn from the reported process of identifying other politicized cases, already underway.334

d) Given the multifaceted harms journalists interviewed for this report suffered, compensate affected journalists and their families who faced unjust prosecutions and/or false cases under the DSA, as also suggested by the Media Reform Commission.335

iv. Adopt gender-sensitive and rights-respecting responses to online harms that do not rely on broad speech offences or criminal defamation by:

a) Repealing or narrowing Section 26 of the CSO, given that it replicates some of the flaws of Section 31 of the DSA.

b) Repealing the criminal defamation provision of the Penal Code, given the risk that it will be used in lieu of a cyber defamation provision.336

v. Introduce long-lasting reforms to protect press freedom:

a) Adopt legislation including a provision like that proposed by the Media Reform Commission protecting media work undertaken in good faith.337

b) Consider the recommendation of the Media Reform Commission to create an independent National Media Commission that would provide for “[r]edressal of complaints from individuals, institutions, or groups affected by false or motivated news.”338As recently found by Bangladesh’s Media Reform Commission, the existing Press Council has been ineffective at resolving complaints about the press: “[t]here is virtually no effective remedy for victims of unethical reporting (such as privacy breaches or false reports) other than seeking legal recourse.”339 Further, the Press Council’s work does not cover online media at all.340 As a result, individuals with complaints against journalists resort to filing criminal cases.

c) Consider establishing a role for such National Media Commission/press body in managing disputes to help divert cases from the criminal justice system. For instance, in Indonesia, the Press Council and the National Police entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to manage disputes involving the press and prevent the inappropriate use of criminal law against journalists. The MoU outlines a collaborative framework for handling cases involving journalists and media outlets, the main aim of which is to ensure that complaints about journalistic work are handled by the Press Council before any criminal investigation or legal action is taken.341 This model has also been proposed in India: The Media Transparency (And Accountability) Bill, 2024 suggests the establishment of a National Media Council. As per Clause 6 of the Bill, permission of the National Media Council would have to be taken before institution of any criminal proceedings against a media outlet or any of its employees regarding any journalistic story or activity.342

vi. Engage at the regional level to progress efforts to dismantle vague and overbroad “digital speech crimes,” using the Bangladesh experience, as documented in this report.

To the Future Government

i.Conduct a comprehensive compatibility review of the speech offences in Bangladesh, including in the CSO, and related procedural laws, as against international standards applicable to Bangladesh, and then adopt/ratify the CSO (with changes), in order to ensure that the CSA does not spring back.

ii.Repeal the criminal defamation provision of the Penal Code, given the risk that it will be used in lieu of a cyber defamation provision.343

iii.Consider legislation to set up institutions and mechanisms for protection of press freedom as highlighted in recommendations v (a), (b) and (c) above.

iv.Given data in this report showing that only one out of 222 cases ended in a conviction, ensure implementation of Section 28 the CSO that criminalizes “any person [who], with the intention of harming another, files or causes any case or complaint to be filed under any provision of this Ordinance without just or lawful reason.” To avoid selective application, create clear criteria for when this offence is triggered (e.g., repeated complaints by third parties about the same reporting; demonstrably false allegations). Regular reports should also be solicited on the application of this provision to determine whether weaponization of the law is being effectively deterred—or whether this provision itself is being instrumentalized.The Media Reform Commission has also proposed draft legislation that would include a provision providing that “[i]f evidence of false cases is found upon review, legal and just action must be taken against the concerned authorities.”344This too should be considered, along with similar, more broadly-applicable recommendations from the Judiciary Reform Committee.345

v.Given that 56% of the cases in our larger dataset remained at the initial stage of police investigation as of July 2024, suggesting significant delays, carefully monitor implementation of other protective provisions of CSO, in particular those establishing time limits for completion of investigations and disposal of cases.

vi.Invite UN bodies and independent experts to assist with reviewing Bangladesh’s speech-restrictive laws and monitoring implementation of reforms.

To the Police

i.

Curb the practice of clubbing offences arbitrarily in FIRs, without application of mind on the offence applicable to the facts of the complaint, and adding non-bailable charges to cases where only bailable offences apply.

ii.

Introduce reforms to prevent arbitrary arrests, search and seizure operations and police misconduct, given that almost half the journalists in the report’s smaller dataset reported that they were arrested at odd hours, and at least fourteen reported mistreatment.In this regard, ensure implementation of Supreme Court guidelines346 and consider reforms suggested by the Police Reform Commission.347

iii.

Observe time-limits for investigating cases and conduct thorough and impartial investigations.

iv.Ensure internal disciplinary procedures for police officers who knowingly pursue baseless or politically-motivated cases, and violate the rights of accused persons, including as documented in this report.

To the Judiciary

i.

Implement Supreme Court guidelines issued in the BLAST judgment in 2016.348

ii.

Reports of warrantless searches and seizures, which are required to be recorded and reported to the Cyber Tribunal, should be made public and carefully reviewed.

iii.

Carefully review police actions during the investigation of a case with full consideration of the rights of accused persons.

iv.

Implement the scheme of time limits for investigations and trials under the CSO, which require reports to the court (by investigators) and to the High Court (by courts) in case of any delay. These reports should be compiled and made public to allow for analysis of the extent to which limits are being respected in practice.

v.

In light of the extreme delays in trials concluding, as documented in the report, consider recommendations of the Judiciary Reform Commission relating to reducing case backlogs.

Notes

  1. General Comment No. 34, para. 13. ↩
  2. IACtHR, Case of Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment of July 2, 2004, Series C No. 107, para. 117. ↩
  3. ECtHR, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy & Satamedia Oy v. Finland, App. No.931/13, June 27, 2017, para. 126. ↩
  4. For instance, in Pakistan, TrialWatch documented the flaws in the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA). See Clooney Foundation for Justice, Deep Flaws in Pakistan’s Cyber Defamation Law Threaten Press Freedom, available at https://cfj.org/news/deep-flaws-in-pakistans-cyber-defamation-law-threaten-press-96 ↩
  5. Clooney Foundation for Justice, Deep Flaws in Pakistan’s Cyber Defamation Law Threaten Press Freedom, available at https://cfj.org/news/deep-flaws-in-pakistanscyber-defamation-law-threaten-press-freedom/. ↩
  6. See Joint Statement for World Press Freedom Day, India: New Amendment to the Information Technology Rules that Threatens Press Freedom Must be Withdrawn. 97 ↩
  7. The Business Standard, Political Parties Urged to Submit FIRs by 30 Nov for Withdrawal of ‘False Cases,’ Nov. 18, 2025, available at https://www.tbsnews.net/bangladesh/political-parties-urged-submit-firs-30-novwithdrawal-false-cases-1288491. 98 ↩
  8. Media Reform Commission Report, p. 145. ↩
  9. Media Reform Commission Report, p. 145. ↩
  10. See Draft Ordinance enacted for providing protection of journalism and journalists’ rights and formulating ancillary provisions, Media Reform Commission Report, p. 176. ↩
  11. Media Reform Commission Report, p. 144. ↩
  12. Media Reform Commission Report, p. 69. 99 ↩
  13. Id., p. 70. ↩
  14. Memorandum of Understanding [unofficial translation], No.2/DP/MoU/II/2017,. This system does not, however, always function as intended. See, e.g., Staff at the American Bar Association Center for Human Rights et al., TrialWatch Fairness Report, Indonesia v. Muhammad Asrul, Indonesia v. Stella Monica, Dec. 2023, available at https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/indonesiaite-report.pdf. ↩
  15. See Media Transparency (And Accountability) Bill, 2024, available at https://pressclubofindia.org/Media-Transparency-Bill.pdf. 100 ↩
  16. Media Reform Commission Report, p. 145. ↩
  17. Media Reform Commission Report, p. 145. ↩
  18. Ashutosh Sarkar, Enact Practical Law to Curb False, Frivolous Cases, The Daily Star, Mar, 19, 2025, available at https://www.thedailystar.net/news/bangladesh/news/enact-practical-law-curb-falsefrivolous-cases-3851776. 101 ↩
  19. Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Appellate Division, Bangladesh v. BLAST, Civil Appeal No. 53/2004, May 24, 2016, available at https://blast.org.bd/content/judgement/Civil_Appeal_No.53_of_2004.pdf?ref=netra.news ↩
  20. Mamum Abdullah, What’s in the Police Reform Commission’s Sweeping Overhaul Plan?, Dhaka Tribune, Jan. 23, 2025 available at https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/371583/what%E2%80%99s-in-the-policereform-commission%E2%80%99s-sweeping 102 ↩
  21. Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Appellate Division, Bangladesh v. BLAST, Civil Appeal No. 53/2004, May 24, 2016, available at https://blast.org.bd/content/judgement/Civil_Appeal_No.53_of_2004.pdf?ref=netra.news.103 ↩