Key Informant Interview (KII) Insights

The study finds that marginalized communities in Bangladesh (including tea workers, the Bede, Dalits, and religious and indigenous groups) are trapped in a system that consistently excludes them. Based on in-depth interviews with experts and community leaders, it is clear that the obstacles to their participation are not accidental but are built into the country’s legal, economic, and social structures. The research highlights a deep lack of trust in political institutions and an urgent need for reforms that go beyond simple promises to ensure actual safety and representation.

Structural Barriers to Minority Participation

The structural barriers that hinder the political participation of socio-economic minority communities in Bangladesh are deeply entrenched, especially for the Bede (gypsies), tea workers, and Dalit communities. These communities face common challenges that limit their engagement in the political process according to our interviewees. Marginalized groups like the Bede and waste cleaners in the informal sector are excluded from the July Reform Commission discussions; so do the Tea workers and the people of Dalit Communities. They are recognized first based on either their religion or occupation and later as a citizen.

Socio-Economic Disenfranchisement

For socio-economic minorities (specifically the Bede, Dalit, and tea worker communities) barriers to entry are foundational. Interview data indicates that these groups are often viewed through the lens of occupation or caste rather than citizenship.

• Bede Community: The Bede people are neither recognized as full citizens nor are their occupations. One Interviewee with extensive experience in working for the Bede Communities stated, Marginalized groups like Bede people are unable to meet basic needs like health, education or living resources which limits their participation in the democratic process. Because of their Nomadic lifestyle and difference from the Plainland people they are socially excluded which is followed by economic exclusion.
• Tea Workers: A former Union Leader of the Tea workers stated that the fate of tea workers has remained same discriminatory and deprived even after the July Movement. Often from marginalized ethnic backgrounds, they lack the economic resources to form political parties or run campaigns. Due to their economic powerlessness, are excluded from political participation and remain invisible in reform efforts.
• Dalit Exclusion: The community faces a similar plight. They are discriminated against based on their occupation or lower caste, often relegated to degrading jobs like sanitation or leatherwork. Dalits, due to their low socio-economic status and lack of support, are excluded both politically and economically, denying them access to rights guaranteed in the constitution, such as education, housing, and fair representation.

Constitutional and Religious Constraints

Religious minority communities in Bangladesh continue to experience structural exclusion from meaningful political participation, shaped by constitutional arrangements, reform processes, and evolving state narratives. Longstanding engagement by minority advocates indicates that the constitutional declaration of Islam as the state religion has contributed to the symbolic and practical marginalization of non-Muslim citizens, reinforcing perceptions of unequal citizenship. This framework has constrained the ability of religious minorities to articulate distinct political concerns within formal state institutions and reform initiatives.

Following the July uprising, the formation of multiple reform commissions was widely viewed as a critical opportunity to address longstanding governance deficits. However, religious and ethnic minority representation within these bodies remained minimal. Where minority individuals were included, their participation was largely confined to commissions with limited influence over core political and constitutional reforms. As a result, minority perspectives were largely absent from key decision-making arenas, weakening the inclusiveness and legitimacy of the reform process.

Interviews further suggest a broader ideological shift in the state’s political discourse. While the 1972 Constitution articulated secularism as a foundational principle aimed at ensuring equal rights across religious communities, subsequent constitutional amendments and political practices have diluted this commitment. Contemporary narratives increasingly emphasize pluralism in abstract terms, without substantively engaging minority experiences of discrimination, insecurity, and exclusion. This shift has effectively sidelined secularism as a protective framework for equal citizenship, contributing to heightened vulnerability and uncertainty among minority communities.

Taken together, these dynamics illustrate how constitutional symbolism, institutional design, and reform practices intersect to limit minority political voice in Bangladesh. The persistence of these barriers underscores the need for more deliberate inclusion of religious minorities in constitutional debates and reform mechanisms if political participation is to be genuinely equitable and representative.

Indigenous Rights and the CHT Crisis

Structural barriers in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) are characterized by the non-implementation of the 1997 Peace Accord.

• Militarization and Governance: Informants from the Khumi and other ethnic groups highlighted that despite a transition to civil governance, a “military-style rule” persists psychologically and operationally. The failure to empower District and Regional Councils has left indigenous populations vulnerable to land dispossession, often allegedly supported by state apparatuses.
• Legal Limbo: The case of the Bawm ethnic group was cited as a stark example of structural failure; an entire community has faced custodial detention and legal isolation, allegedly due to the actions of a few, dismantling their capacity for local defense or community leadership.

Role of Political Parties and Institutions

The relationship between minority groups and political institutions is characterized by a deficit of trust and a crisis of representation.

The Rise of Right-Wing Influence

A prevailing anxiety among all interviewed groups is the resurgence of right-wing political entities.

• Sectarian Citizenship: In relation to the right-wing party’s sectarian definition of citizenship based on religion A social activist for Bede Community expressed concern whether nomadic Muslim Bede people would be able to meet the idealized “Muslim citizen” criteria, as they are often illiterate and do not conform to traditional Sunni or Shia classifications. Overall, the combination of a weak and corrupt administration and the rise of right-wing politics have left marginalized communities feeling increasingly hopeless about their integration into the political system.
• Political Pawns: One Interviewee from the tea workers’ community, highlighted their vulnerability as economically powerless and voiceless, making them easy pawns in political maneuvering. They recalled how, during the Awami League regime, tea workers were accused of being BNP sympathizers whenever they protested for land rights or fair wages. As the upcoming elections approached, they expressed little hope of fair representation. They believe they remain marginalized within the political parties. Moreover, during the Interim Government’s regime, many innocent tea workers were unjustly labelled as allies of the former ruling party, further deepening their sense of exclusion.
• Dalit Representation: The community spokesperson shared a somewhat mixed perspective. They acknowledged that some individuals from their community have received nominations, albeit in very limited numbers. However, their concerns mirrored those of the tea workers regarding the rise of right-wing parties. She pointed out the unjust imprisonment of the poor and powerless from the Harijan Community, such as those involved in the Chinmoy Prabhu case, who have no means to hire legal representation or gain support.²⁶

Institutional Failures and Article 70

All our interviewees from religious marginalized groups agreed about the lack of representation in the parliament and political support. Their primary concern is the growing influence of right-wing parties, which exacerbate religious and ethnic divisions. They said that right-wing politics, characterized by religious fanaticism and communalism, directly threatens minority communities. They also said that these forces do not believe in equal rights and free thought, instead targeting the weak and vulnerable. One expert provided a more detailed description of how political participation of Minority Community is constitutionally flawed:

“When a minority or indigenous person is nominated by a political party to go to parliament, they become bound by that party’s decisions and discipline. Article 70 of our constitution presents a major obstacle. If they go against the party’s decision, their membership can be revoked. As a result, there is virtually no opportunity for them to speak up for the interests of their community. As a result, minority representatives cannot raise issues regarding their community’s rights or discrimination outside their party’s stance. If they are elected as independent candidates, they may have a bit more freedom to speak. However, in our reality, it is extremely difficult for minorities to get elected as independents. Due to political power, financial resources, and party influence, this path is almost closed.”

The experts collectively underscore that the rise of right-wing politics and the failure of political institutions to address their concerns have left minority communities feeling increasingly vulnerable and excluded from the political mainstream.

Demographic Engineering in CHT

Historically, the CHT were overwhelmingly inhabited by ethnic minority communities. In 1872, these groups constituted approximately 98 percent of the population, while Bengalis accounted for only about 2 percent. Even during 1951–1956, ethnic minorities still made up around 90 percent of the region’s population, with Bengalis comprising most of the remaining 10 percent. By 1991, the proportion of Hill peoples had declined sharply to roughly 51.4 percent, while the Bengali population rose dramatically to 48.5 percent. More recently, according to the 2022 census, the share of indigenous populations in the CHT has further declined to around 50 percent, indicating a continuing demographic shift in the region.

Media Narratives and Minority Visibility

Media coverage of minority issues is described as sporadic, crisis-driven, and devoid of nuance.

The Invisibility of the Tea Workers: A representative of tea workers explained that, given the current security situation, many workers are not interested in running as election candidates. While there are no formal barriers to seeking nominations, workers feel discouraged because of social and political insecurity and believe that political parties are unlikely to nominate them. Tea workers are often kept out of public view, and their struggles receive little attention, even from the media. In recent years, many tea gardens have closed, leaving workers without income and, in some cases, without enough food, yet these conditions drew little response from either major political parties. One reason for this silence is the lack of strong organizations representing tea workers. They lack a strong organizational presence, with no national-level office and few effective local groups to represent their interests. As a result, individuals who might otherwise speak out or try to organize often hesitate due to concerns about their own safety and the safety of their families, further reducing public visibility and meaningful political participation.

Negative Impacts of Social Media: Since July, violence against Dalits has definitely increased. In the past, such incidents were not as visible. Even if something happened, it wouldn’t spread widely. But now, with platforms like Facebook and X handle, these incidents spread quickly, and people can see what is happening. For example, the Bundel colony incident in Chittagong, where Dalit community members were taken into custody. They weren’t involved in the conflict, but they were still taken. Just because a few were involved, they all were targeted. Now, many of the men from that colony are in jail, and no one is speaking on their behalf. There is no lawyer standing up for them. As for the ones in jail, there hasn’t even been any news coverage about them.

Security, Discrimination, and Intimidation

The security landscape for minorities is defined by a “Culture of Impunity” and economic predation.

Economic Discrimination as Violence: Violence against minorities is often economic in nature.

• The Bede people experience social exclusion from the broader society, primarily due to their nomadic lifestyle. They are often deprived of access to traditional education and healthcare, particularly women. According to one expert working with the Bede community, the government must establish inclusive policies that address their specific needs, as current efforts, such as providing a small stipend for Bede children to attend school, fail to integrate them into society meaningfully. Their highest contribution in politics is they can sell their vote for 500 or 1000 taka on the day of election. The security and discrimination dimension of Bede people are different from the other marginalized groups such as tea workers as they already live with the plainland people.
• Wage Theft: Tea workers are trapped in a cycle of poverty. Our interviewee said that their daily wage of 170 taka is grossly inadequate in the face of rising inflation. The wage Board, formed in 2019, declared that the wage will increase by 5% every year but the price inflation in Bangladesh is rising by 9% to 12%. This economic vulnerability leaves them easy targets for repression, especially during election times. He shed light on these issues by going further: those workers around the country can form a Union with just 20 people but tea workers have to form a Union with all the tea workers around the country which in most cases is impossible. This systematic barrier coupled with economic discrimination is making tea workers invisible in society.
• Land Grabbing: In both the plainlands and CHT, communal violence is frequently a smokescreen for land appropriation. When minority families flee violence, their property is often seized or sold at distressed rates.

The Post-July Security Vacuum Religious minorities reported a sharp deterioration in security following the July uprising.

• Administrative Bias: Over the past 17 months, they have observed that minority recruitment has practically reached zero, and most of those already employed have been dismissed without any reason, promotions have completely stopped. We saw that even during the recruitment process by the Public Service Commission, although they were included initially, in the end, they did not receive jobs. Various labels have been attached to them. As a result, we are extremely disappointed with the recruitment happening so far. Furthermore, they are not following any proportional representation. For example, nearly 48 judges were appointed to the high court in two phases, one in the first phase and that too was based on political affiliation, while in the second phase, no appointments were made.
• Electoral Violence: Almost all of our interviewees opined that the current Interim Government keeps the same mentality as the previous government. They all are perpetrators of the culture of Denial. Thousands of houses have been burnt, abuse of women, false allegations in the name of religious blasphemy- all are denied by the interim government. The culture of impunity is the founding reason which perpetrates this kind of violence over the years. This has created the belief that attacking minorities will have no consequences. In the Language of research, minorities have become soft targets. Their land, homes, and jobs are taken, and little to no justice is provided. Another reason is economic interests. In many cases, behind the attacks is the political rivalry and the desire to grab land and property. When a family is forced to leave the area in fear, the opportunity arises to buy land at a low price.

During elections, the situation for minorities becomes extremely precarious. Whether they vote or not, they are attacked. If they vote, they are questioned about whom they voted for; if they do not vote, they are asked why. In both scenarios, they face looting, attacks, land grabbing, and even sexual violence. This is why election-related violence keeps recurring. As a result, there is tremendous fear within the minority communities. Many women have publicly stated that even if their names are removed from the voter list, they will not object, as long as they can stay safe. One interviewee pressed that- “This is a deeply shameful reality for a democratic state. Every election, minorities live in fear, and with the upcoming election, this same fear has returned”.

• CHT Instability: The post-July period has been associated with a visible deterioration in security conditions in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), particularly across Bandarban, Rangamati, and Khagrachari. Interviewees described this phase as one of renewed instability, marked by localized violence, intimidation, and heightened uncertainty for residents and community leaders. Within these accounts, incidents such as the Rakhachhera violence (September 2024), Guimara and Rangamati arson attack (2025) were repeatedly referenced as illustrative moments that signaled the fragility of public order in the region.*²⁷

From the perspective of respondents, these events reflect more than isolated law-and-order failures. Rather, they were interpreted as evidence of deeper governance and political constraints, including inconsistent enforcement and a perceived reluctance to uphold neutrality among law enforcement agencies. Several interviewees argued that the interim government has not demonstrated sufficient political will to ensure impartial security administration, allowing competing local interests and informal power dynamics to shape policing outcomes. This perceived absence of neutral enforcement has, in turn, reinforced insecurity and weakened confidence in state protection mechanisms during a politically sensitive transition.

Expert’s Perspectives on Reform and Inclusion

Experts provided concrete recommendations to dismantle these barriers, emphasizing that performative secularism is insufficient without structural guarantees.

Political Quotas and Proportional Representation : “If political parties adopt a culture of proportional representation and commit to giving 10% of the candidates from minority communities, it would mean that each party would have to field about 30 minority candidates. This commitment would ensure that some of them are elected. When a minority candidate is elected with such a commitment, they will see themselves as a representative of the minorities. However, currently, many see themselves as political affiliates rather than minority representatives, and the law on floor crossing creates further barriers for them”.

“In the future, if the upper chamber of parliament has a policy where the deputy speaker or the head of important parliamentary committees is from the opposition, this could be considered a form of quota. We could also introduce a quota for the chairperson of the upper chamber to be from the minority community. If a party is dominant, they should take responsibility for ensuring that minorities are included and feel secure”.

Economic and Social Empowerment Policies

• Tea Workers: To improve the situation of tea workers, interviewees emphasized the need to grant them the right to form unions at the company, upazila, and even individual garden levels. They also stressed that meaningful change requires long-term investment rather than short-term relief. According to them, training and capacity-building for tea workers would take at least five years to develop leadership, skills, and organizational strength, enabling workers to become self-reliant. The core message was clear: instead of one-time assistance, tea workers need sustained support that helps them build the ability to stand on their own and advocate for their rights independently.
• Dalit Community : Anti-discrimination policies must be a priority, and political leaders, regardless of their party affiliation, should push for the passing of anti-discrimination laws. The budgets allocated for minority welfare, particularly for women and girls, are often insufficient, and there is a need to allocate funds based on the number of people in these communities.
• Bede Community: Our interviewee, who is an expert and social worker for the Bede Community, recommended that the government should take inclusive policy to integrate the Bede people to mainland life, culture and workforce. The development policy for the Bede people should be tailored according to their specific needs. He suggested a mobile school for Bede children, an expert teacher trained for living in Bede Bohor and teaching them. In the question of employment, the Bede Community can be an excellent sell force in the village areas. Many Bede people now want to live in the mainland because they need education, health and living support. Inclusive and specific tailored policy according to their Nomadic lifestyle can be beneficial for this marginalized people.
• Indigenous Representation: Experts demanded reserved Vice-Chairman positions in local government councils (Union Parishads) in areas with significant indigenous populations (e.g., Sylhet, Mymensingh), noting that despite large populations of Garo and Khasia people, no indigenous Chairman has been elected in 15-20 years due to financial barriers.

Institutional Overhaul : There is a shared view that minority issues related to identity, culture, and protection require focused institutional attention beyond general social welfare measures. At the same time, political representatives from minority communities often lack the confidence to raise these concerns openly in Parliament, particularly when doing so may conflict with their party’s official position. Existing constitutional and party practices have traditionally discouraged members from speaking against the government line, as dissent could lead to the loss of parliamentary membership. This environment has limited the ability of minority representatives to independently voice concerns or criticize policies affecting their communities, reinforcing silence even on issues of clear public interest.

Conclusion of Findings: The interviews collectively suggest that the future democratic government will uphold the rule of law, human rights, and justice, reflecting the core values of our independence struggle: equality, human dignity, and social justice. These three elements were incorporated into the constitution, but they have not been properly implemented, which has led the state into crisis today. We hope the next democratic government will not lead the country astray, and that we can move forward.

Notes

26. [Note: This concern aligns with widespread media reports documenting the crackdown and denial of bail for protesters in Chattogram following the arrest of Hindu leader Chinmoy Krishna Das in late 2024]. ↩
27. On September 18, 2024, violent clashes erupted in Pankhaya Para, Khagrachhari, following the mob killing of a Bengali man. In the subsequent unrest, clashes between Bangalee settlers and Indigenous groups led to the deaths of four indigenous people. At least 37 homes and shops belonging to Indigenous communities were looted and burned down during the fighting in Khagrachhari and Rangamati. The violence extended to Rangamati town on September 20, 2024, where shops and properties in Indigenous areas such as Kalindipur, Bijon Sarani, Dewan Para, and Tridip Nagar were set on fire, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council office was vandalized and torched. On September 28, 2025, unrest in Guimara upazila, Khagrachhari, erupted during protests following allegations of sexual violence against a schoolgirl. The violence spilled into widespread property damage the following day. Journalists reported that many homes and shops owned by Indigenous Marma community members were looted and burned during the chaos, with security forces unable to prevent or stop the arson over several hours. At least three civilians were killed in the broader unrest around this period. ↩