Small State Capabilities in Managing Regional Power Rivalries: Case Study of Bangladesh

Parvez Karim Abbasi

This paper is part of a series of analyses of small-state strategies in navigating large-power competition. Experts were commissioned in Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka to produce papers examining how those countries have managed relations between large powers such as China, India, and the United States, which are increasingly vying for political and economic influence across Asia.

The papers each examine three case studies that illuminate the strategies small states use to pursue their interests vis-à-vis large powers. In particular, the papers examine the domestic political considerations that shape the countries’ actions, an underexplored dynamic in international relations research. A summary paper synthesizes the findings of the country papers and advances macro analysis and findings about the options and limitations for small states to maximize their positions relative to competing large powers.

Introduction

Bangladesh occupies an enviable geostrategic location of critical importance in Asia, as it sits between an increasingly prosperous yet politically volatile South Asia and economically dominant Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, the broader region feels the strains of the geopolitical and geoeconomic competition between the United States and China. Bangladesh, like other South Asian nations, has experienced the dominant influence of India owing to its landmass, population, economy, and military superiority.

The ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan has been subsumed to a degree by rising tensions between India and China, which has made inroads in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI. China has made substantial investments and provided loans to develop physical infrastructure such as ports, bridges, power stations, and railways. In the past, smaller nations like Bangladesh had managed to play off the India-China rivalry to extract concessions. However, the return of great power competition between the United States and China has breathed new life into the South Asian geopolitical and economic dynamics. In certain instances, U.S. and Indian interests have converged, backed by economic and development assistance provided by the Japanese. Thus, there is a threeway power play between the United States, India, and China to exert tangible influence human rights violations, electoral irregularities, and shrinking civic space has strained Bangladesh-U.S. ties. Bangladesh relies on the West as an export market, particularly for ready-made garments. The United States is Bangladesh’s largest export market, the European Union is the largest bloc export destination, Japan is the largest development donor, and the United States is the largest cumulative investor. However, China and India are Bangladesh’s largest import partners, and Chinese loans and investments have become more important.

This analysis uses Sheikh Hasina’s 2009-2024 regime as a reference period. By examining three case studies, it provides a compelling example of how a small state attempts to conduct its foreign policy amidst geopolitical rivalry between its immediate neighbor, India, and near neighbor, China, and respond to increased U.S. pressure.

Methodology

The paper is based primarily on qualitative analysis with supporting quantitative data and figures. A review of existing literature, newspaper articles, and media reports was used when appropriate. In addition, this paper includes analysis from interviews conducted with two noted geopolitical experts and foreign policy analysts: Shafqat Munir, research fellow and head of Bangladesh Centre for Terrorism Research at the Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies, and Zillur Rahman, media personality, political analyst, and President at the Center for Governance Studies.

Case Study 1

Forcible Displacement of Myanmar Nationals

Bangladesh has been hard hit by the sudden influx of Rohingyas since the onset of the Myanmar government’s 2017 campaign against the Muslim minority in Rakhine State.

Bangladesh currently hosts more than a million refugees and has been straining under the economic and financial costs amidst declining international funding. A marked decline in law and order and clashes with local communities have further complicated the situation for Bangladesh.

However, due to the significant influence of China and India, and to an extent Russia,

Bangladesh has demurred from taking an active and aggressive role in pressuring Myanmar to take back its people. Owing to these pressures, Bangladesh has been unable or unwilling to proactively mobilize and engage Western capitals on the Rohingya issue. Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy demonstrates the regional and international rivalries regarding the Rohingya crisis.

Domestic Considerations of the Bangladeshi Government

The Bangladeshi government under Sheikh Hasina sought to leverage the Rohingya crisis to bolster its public image abroad and to unite a fractious local populace at home behind a single cause. In the run-up to the 2018 election, the regime hoped its stance on the Rohingya crisis would help garner votes from the Muslim-majority electorate and also boost the premier’s chances of being shortlisted for the Nobel Peace Prize.

The local print and electronic media became vociferous supporters of the Rohingya initiative of the Bangladeshi government and Islamic organizations, which gave their enthusiastic support. Local academics were enlisted to generate support on talk shows and in newspaper articles. There was an initial flurry of diplomatic activities, and Sheikh Hasina raised the Rohingya issue at the United Nations General Assembly in her

International Pressures

China One of the key reasons why the Bangladeshi government failed to secure a decisive breakthrough on resolving the Rohingya crisis was the competing geopolitical pressures of major and regional powers. China, one of the closest supporters of the Awami League government, has significant geostrategic interests in Myanmar. Myanmar is the only immediate neighbour that provides China with convenient, direct access to the Indian Ocean, bypassing the contested South China Sea and congested Strait of Malacca, which the United States could potentially block in a conflict scenario. Such a connection is vital for exporting Chinese goods and importing fossil fuel from the Middle East and minerals from Africa. That is why China has built oil and gas pipelines from the shores of the Bay of Bengal to its southern province of Yunnan and plans to construct highways and a high-speed rail along the same route.

As part of the plan, Chinese state-owned entities are developing a USD 7.3 billion deepwater port at Kyaukphyu on the coast of Myanmar’s Rakhine State and a USD 1.3 billion special economic zone, which includes an oil and gas terminal. Those projects are located at the lower end of the 1,700-kilometer China-Myanmar Economic Corridor connecting Kunming in China’s Yunnan province to the Indian Ocean.14 Chinese investment in Myanmar currently stands at 26 percent of total foreign direct investment, Hasina and had significant influence on Bangladesh’s foreign and domestic policies. At the same time, India did not want to antagonize Myanmar and encouraged bilateral talks between Dhaka and Naypyidaw to resolve the crisis without relying on Western support.

Russia Ties between Myanmar and Russia date to the Soviet era. However, in recent times, Myanmar has engaged Russia extensively to reduce its reliance on China. Russia provided Myanmar’s military with USD 276 million worth of supplies between 2021 and 2022, compared to armaments valued at USD 156 million from China. A UN report states that Russian entities transferred USD 406 million in defense supplies to Myanmar during the same period, with China in second place at USD 267 million. Apart from Myanmar becoming a lucrative market for the Russian defense industry, Russia has also shown interest in oil and gas exploration and mining in Myanmar.19 Russia also became a vocal supporter of the Hasina regime, especially after Bangladesh’s contested elections in 2019 and 2024. Russian investment in Bangladesh’s Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant gave Russia leverage over Dhaka. Russia was equally concerned about the threat of Western intervention in Myanmar and advocated a peaceful resolution of the Rohingya issue without Dhaka trying to internationalize it.

The United States and the West The United States had multiple interests in Myanmar that would be served by the restoration of democracy (especially during the Biden era). First, the Biden administration had prioritized a values-based foreign policy, and Southeast Asia has witnessed a rise in authoritarianism over the past decade. Second, the military in Myanmar is the primary cause of its chronic instability, including its transnational crime epidemic. Third, the United States has an interest in a strong, central Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as an anchor in the Indo-Pacific. The Myanmar issue divides ASEAN politically, and a rehabilitated junta regime would likely act against U.S. interests within ASEAN. Fourth, Myanmar is of geostrategic importance to the Indo-Pacific, as it bridges South and Southeast Asia, and the military regime partners with

Criticisms of Bangladesh’s Rohingya Policy

Experts interviewed about Bangladesh’s Rohingya policy primarily characterized the policy as a failure. According to Mr. Shafqat Munir, the Rohingya policy of the Hasina regime was flawed from the outset. Rohingyas were taken in without any contingency planning. Opening the border for Rohingyas fleeing from Tatmadaw violence was initiated by Hasina, who thought that the move would garner positive attention from the international media and boost her image abroad. Her followers bestowed her with the title of “Mother of Humanity.” The situation was exacerbated by a foreign secretary and a coterie of academics and intelligence agency operatives who did not provide a realistic assessment of the extent of challenges involved with Rohingya repatriation.

Think tanks supporting government narratives started proliferating in Dhaka. Efforts to open a meaningful dialogue with Myanmar—then ruled by the National League for Democracy under Aung San Suu Kyi—were never pursued in earnest. After 2022, to appease China, Bangladesh undertook various attempts to carry out the involuntary repatriation of the Rohingyas. However, the efforts yielded little or no tangible results.

Zillur Rahman stated that the former prime minister was motivated more by the desire to be in the running for a Nobel Peace Prize when she decided to offer shelter to the Rohingya refugees. Neither she nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was able to gauge the degree of support China, India, or, for that matter, Japan would directly or indirectly extend to Myanmar. Excessive dependence on China prevented the Bangladeshi government from internationalizing the issue. Despite initial Western support, Bangladesh was not able to capitalize on it. This was due to the ongoing tensions between Bangladesh and the United States regarding U.S. concerns surrounding the state of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law under Sheikh Hasina. The foreign policy of Bangladesh was conducted at the direction of the former premier, without substantive input from Foreign Ministry or intelligence officials. India was driving Dhaka’s foreign policy, and China was being courted for investment in infrastructural projects. NGOs were actively courted for funding as well. Competent academics, specialists, and private think tanks were rarely used.

Dhaka’s Policy Options and Eventual Policy Stance

The Awami League regime wanted to make the Rohingya issue the centrepiece of its foreign policy outreach. It aimed to raise its soft power while carefully deflecting and diverting international criticism of the shrinking of democratic and civic space at home. However, Bangladesh had to navigate conflicting objectives of two blocs—the Western bloc led by the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and the European Union, and the non-Western bloc led by China, India, and Russia. The Western bloc wanted Dhaka to internationalize the Rohingya issue and involve Western countries in putting pressure on the military regime in Myanmar. This policy required more aggressive posturing from Dhaka. India, China, and Russia, each with varied geostrategic interests in Myanmar, wanted Dhaka to opt for bilateral negotiations with Myanmar and were wary of greater Western involvement. There was a fear in New Delhi, Beijing, and Moscow that the United States would use the Rohingya issue as a pretext to gain a bridgehead in Bangladesh, which would provide it with greater strategic flexibility in terms of implementing its Indo-Pacific objectives.

At first, Dhaka attempted to balance between the conflicting objectives of the rival blocs. It tried to internationalize the Rohingya issue and welcomed Western media and NGOs to Bangladesh to provide wider coverage of the plight of the Rohingyas in the country. It also sought to secure the cooperation of China, Russia, and India in putting pressure on Myanmar to repatriate the Rohingyas. However, Russia and China’s repeated vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions and India’s neutrality/ambiguity made the task even more difficult. The military coup by the Tatmadaw in 2021 and the continued

Outcome and Implications

Bangladesh’s foreign policy approach failed to resolve the Rohingya crisis in the country. Initial enthusiasm for the Rohingyas among the local populace gave way to fatigue and increased concern about the threat posed by deterioration in law and order, smuggling of narcotics, and increased violence in the refugee camps.25 The prospects of repatriation dimmed, and the altered ground reality has led to less than favorable coverage and assessment of the government’s Rohingya policy by the media and analysts.

Analysts and the public have questioned Bangladesh’s ability to conduct an independent foreign policy regarding Myanmar.26 Further, elites and the public have criticized the role of China, India, and Russia and cited the premier’s hubris and desire to remain in power as a cause of foreign policy failure in this case.

Dhaka’s stance under the Hasina regime compared unfavorably with Bangladesh’s response to Myanmar’s previous attempts to forcibly push in Rohingyas across the border. In May 1978, following the launching of Operation Nagamin (Dragon King)—a national effort to register citizens and screen out foreigners before a national census— around 200,000 Rohingyas had taken shelter in Bangladesh. Almost immediately upon the refugees’ arrival, the Bangladeshi government engaged its Burmese counterpart in a discussion on their repatriation. Bangladeshi authorities complained of the economic and social burden of the presence of the Rohingya and insisted that there would be no local integration. The United Nations also urged the Burmese leadership to allow the Rohingyas’ repatriation. UN officials hinted that a flow of aid, which the Ne Win government in Burma was pursuing through a more open foreign policy, would be more readily accessible should the ruling Burmese Socialist Programme Party agree to the returns. The Burmese government relented, and the Rohingya began to return home.

Case Study 2

The Teesta River

Bangladesh’s geography downstream from India and reliance on water from its neighbor have long been a source of tension. In 1977, Bangladesh filed a protest at the United Nations over the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River. Teesta River water sharing has also been a source of dispute for decades, with Bangladesh claiming India has not adhered to sharing agreements.28 The proposed interlinking project by the Indian government has also raised alarms in Bangladesh, as the countries share 54 common rivers.

China’s offer to build a multipurpose dam in Teesta, close to the strategic Siliguri Corridor of Northeast India, rattled policymakers in New Delhi.29 This is especially so considering the recent border clashes in Doklam, the renewal of tensions in Arunachal Pradesh, and rising unrest in states such as Manipur. India proposed a counteroffer, which was sparse on details, angered most Bangladeshis, and alienated China.30 The Teesta episode provides a commentary on the Sino-Indian rivalry and power projection in Bangladesh.

Dhaka’s Policy Options and Eventual Policy Stance

The Teesta River, a tributary of the Brahmaputra, is among the 54 transboundary rivers between India and Bangladesh. It flows southward from Sikkim and northern Bengal before entering Bangladesh. As the country’s fourth largest river and the primary water source for its northern regions, it’s crucial for irrigation, supporting millions of citizens and accounting for 14 percent of crop production. Upstream dam construction in the north-eastern Indian states has significantly restricted water flow and adversely affected requested that Bangladesh revise its loan application and submit a new implementation plan if the government still deemed the project essential, which Bangladesh agreed in principle.

However, the situation changed dramatically with Hasina’s June 2024 visit to India, where she agreed to proceed with the Indian offer to finance the Teesta project, estimated to cost more than USD 1.1 billion. However, the Indian proposal was less concrete and emphasized conducting joint surveys to assess the water requirements of both countries. India was seen to have played a pivotal role in preventing excessive pressure from the United States on Bangladesh regarding holding free and fair elections in January 2024. Indian help was seen as crucial in securing Hasina a fourth term.

In the Teesta River case, Bangladesh practiced hedging between contrasting Chinese and Indian objectives. Hedging in this case refers to Bangladesh’s balancing act between India and China, especially in an uncertain environment where the outcome of a conflict of competition is not clearly visible. By sending positive signals to both sides instead of aligning with one, hedging actors like Bangladesh want to avoid dependence on a single actor and maximize their political and economic profits. However, as the Hasina government felt beholden to India’s intervention with the United States to secure a fourth term, it swung to India’s position. Thus, the Bangladeshi policy on the Teesta River shifted from hedging to bandwagoning.

Outcome and Implications

Unfortunately, the shift in stance by the Hasina government on the Teesta River and openly aligning with India at the risk of alienating China was widely criticized at home

Case Study 3

Trade Dynamics

The sustained economic growth of Bangladesh and its gradual integration into a globalized economy have influenced its foreign policy. The country aims to increase merchandise exports and ensure an uninterrupted supply of raw materials, intermediate commodities, and electricity via reliable import channels. The export and import dependence on various countries, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, China, and India, means that Bangladesh’s foreign policy is also dominated by its trading concerns and priorities. To a certain extent, Bangladesh behaves as a trading state because trade plays a key role in its economy.

Richard Rosecrance (1986) elaborated on the concept of the trading state, which revolves around the emphasis placed by the state on economic factors while formulating and implementing foreign policy. According to his analysis, states are interdependent because of globalization, and a “trading state” prefers “soft power” instead of “hard power.” These states choose cooperation and try to increase their role in global economic markets and gain economic development instead of occupying other states’ areas.

Regarding Bangladesh’s exports, the top five leading destinations from 2015 to 2019 were the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and Spain. The U.S. remains the largest single-nation market, amounting to more than USD 6.8 billion in 2019. The RMG sector comprises nearly 84 percent of Bangladesh’s annual exports, highlighting the extreme dependence on a single category of exports. Europe (62 percent of export value) and the United States (18 percent of export value) remain the RMG industry’s leading customer markets, although dependency on the United States has decreased recently.

China and India have been the leading import partners of Bangladesh for more than a decade and will continue to be dominant in the foreseeable future. Chinese imports to Bangladesh totaled USD 17.3 billion in 2019; India’s imports amounted to more than USD 8.2 billion. Geographic proximity, which results in lower transportation costs, the availability of natural resources and intermediate goods, the relative affordability of manufactured fast-moving consumer goods, and a long history of political and commercial engagement all contribute to China and India’s dominant position in the Bangladeshi market.

The main products that Bangladesh imported from China were refined petroleum (USD 861M), Light Rubberized Knitted Fabric (USD 749M), and Light Pure Woven Cotton (USD 710M). During 1995-2019, Chinese exports to Bangladesh increased at an annualized rate of 14.8 percent. The main products imported by Bangladesh from India were nonretail pure cotton yarn (USD 541M), raw cotton (USD 539M), and electricity (USD 505M). During the last 24 years, India’s exports to Bangladesh increased at an annualized rate of 9.27 percent.

Dhaka’s Policy Options and Eventual Policy Stance

Bangladesh has varied and multifaceted economic engagements with major stakeholders such as the United States, the United Kingdom, EU member countries, China, and India. Owing to its desire to maximize its national income and social welfare for its citizens, Bangladesh increasingly behaves like a trading state. It requires access to markets for its exports, an uninterrupted supply of essential raw materials for its export-oriented industries, and a larger volume of investments to grow its economy. Thus, Bangladesh cannot afford to take sides in the era of great power competition as it will imperil its economic interests. Overriding national economic interests dictate Bangladesh’s current stance of geopolitical neutrality on the global stage.

Outcome and Implications

The export figures underscore the vital importance of the U.S. market, in particular, and the Western markets, in general. It is also widely known that there is broad convergence on strategic issues between the United States, the United Kingdom, and EU countries. Bangladesh’s lack of meaningful export diversification means its economic fortunes are inextricably linked to Western markets in the short to medium term. This also implies that Bangladeshi policy planners at the Foreign Ministry must pay greater attention to U.S.-led Western strategic concerns and sensibilities and devise ways to engage them in meaningful dialogues. Such interaction should be aimed at securing expanded and preferential market access comparable to that enjoyed by select African countries under the African Growth and Opportunity Act or Vietnam’s preferential trade agreement with the European Union since 2020.

The RMG sector is an example of the effective use of technology transfer and foreign direct investment, and the rise of an adaptive, resilient entrepreneurial class with adequate incentives provided by successive governments since the late 1970s. The nascent entrepreneurial class associated with the RMG sector became the present-day titans of industry who have played a key role in private-sector development. The RMG lobby could act as a quasi-private conduit with concerned entities in the United States Bangladesh’s foreign policy neutrality claims can be justified to a certain extent by its trading composition and the need to maintain amicable relations with its trade partners. It cannot afford to alienate its major trading partners. The business community of Bangladesh would drive the Bangladeshi government to maintain a course of geopolitical neutrality.

Analysis

Bangladesh’s foreign policy approach had been traditionally predicated on the guiding maxim of “Friendship to all, malice to none.” However, in practice, since 2014, the government of Sheikh Hasina turned more autocratic and was accused of manipulating and even rigging local and national elections. This, in turn, invited rebuke and criticism from the West, led and spearheaded by successive U.S. administrations.42 The political consideration of retaining state control at any cost seemed to permeate all layers of government policymaking, along with greater centralization of power in the prime minister’s office.43 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also started to conduct foreign policy according to the political dictates of the ruling party, as opposed to national interests. Greater reliance and warmer relations were forged with non-Western countries such as India, China, and Russia, which overtly practiced a policy of non-intervention and supported Hasina’s government.44 As successive elections became even more onesided and controversial, Hasina relied increasingly on the non-Western axis of nations. What helped the Hasina regime was the blossoming of the incipient rivalry between India and China in South Asia. Bangladesh managed to play off both countries and secure concessions. While India was more prominent in bolstering security ties, China increasingly became the source of investment in mega-infrastructure projects, which opened greater opportunities for kickbacks and corruption amongst the upper echelons of the ruling class in Dhaka. Russia also became a conduit for funds. Bangladesh, like several other South Asian nations, benefited from the Sino-Indian rivalry and proudly boasted of adroitly pulling off a tightrope walk.

The context is important to understand how Bangladesh conducted its foreign policy regarding the Rohingya and the Teesta River issues. In both cases, there was an initial attempt to extract the maximum possible advantage without firmly committing to one side. In the Rohingya case, Bangladesh tried to balance the major foreign players’ different—and at times conflicting—objectives. The U.S.-led Western bloc wanted Dhaka to pursue the Rohingya issue with Myanmar proactively and to co-opt the Bangladeshi policymakers and the Bangladeshi Government in the process. Meanwhile, China, India, and Russia pressured Bangladesh to take a less aggressive approach and rely on bilateral negotiations or mediation by a third country acceptable to Myanmar and Bangladesh. The balancing approach was soon abandoned, and Bangladesh sought Chinese mediation to resolve the dispute. This bandwagoning was made possible by increased Western criticism of Bangladesh’s lack of democracy and China’s increasing importance in the Bangladeshi economy.

Similarly, the eventual outcome of the Teesta River was also bandwagoning, where Bangladesh decisively swung in line with India’s geostrategic objectives. However, the similarity ends here. In the case of the Rohingya issue, the bandwagoning involved moving away from Western policy alignment to one of the Chinese. However, in the Teesta River case, it was moving away from China to India. Also, Bangladesh’s initial stance in the case of the water-sharing dispute was to engage both China and India to secure a better deal. India’s security concerns and close identification with Hasina’s regime meant that Bangladesh had to fall in line with Indian wishes.

Only in terms of trade dynamics and the resulting influence on Bangladesh’s foreign policy is there an attempt at neutrality, with considerable trade engagement with both the Western and Indian and Chinese partners. This was more by default than by design. The export of mainly RMG products at bulk volume has traditionally gone to the United States, the United Kingdom, and EU member nations, while the import of raw materials, intermediate products, and capital machinery and foodstuffs was dominated by China and India. The desire to balance the export and import partners meant that Bangladesh couldn’t afford to rupture ties with these important stakeholders. The business lobby, which in many instances was heavily involved in the export and import of merchandise, formed a key constituent of the decision-making elite of Bangladesh. Many business leaders had entered the parliament as ruling Awami League legislators and exercised some influence on the implementation of Bangladesh’s foreign policy.

Implications

The short-term implications of the foreign policy pursued by the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina are easier to gauge than the long-term ones. In the Rohingya and Teesta cases, the Bangladeshi government failed to achieve its desired objectives. The Rohingyas have not been repatriated to Myanmar, and there is no credible solution to the Teesta River water sharing or joint basin management. The government incurred the ire and wrath of the people of Bangladesh, who, by and large, think that an independent foreign policy reflective of Bangladesh’s priorities and concerns has not been achieved. Relations with India have soured, and Chinese investments are looked at with suspicion. In terms of trade composition, no significant changes in the short term are expected to happen, owing to the inherent composition of the Bangladeshi economy. After the ouster of the Hasina government, the more Western-inclined interim government may carry out significant changes in foreign policy, in particular regarding the Rohingyas and the Teesta River.

Mr. Parvez Karim Abbasi Mr. Parvez Karim Abbasi, is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics, East West University, Dhaka, Bangladesh and Executive Director, Centre for Governance Studies (CGS). Mr. Abbasi’s research interests primarily lies in Geopolitics, Geo-economics, Political Economy and Energy Security, with special focus on BRI and IPS. He focuses on using inter disciplinary approach consisting of Economics, History, Political Science, International Relations, and Sociology to analyze complex, multilayered sociopolitical and economic issues with domestic and international relevance. He has published multiple academic articles in both local as well as international peer-reviewed journals. He also has attended and presented papers at local as well as international conferences. Mr. Abbasi occasionally writes opeds and columns for English language publications in Dhaka which has been favorably received both at home and abroad. He frequently participates as an expert discussant in TV Talk shows and media outlets on International relations and Geostrategic issues.

Centre for Governance Studies (CGS)

The Centre for Governance Studies (CGS) strives to advance democratic values, strengthen good governance, and uphold human rights in Bangladesh at a time of rapid national and global transformation. Established in 2004 and developed into a full-fledged think tank by 2016, CGS works to promote transparency, accountability, and inclusive development by bringing together the academic community, government, private sector, civil society, and development partners. Its mission encompasses combating misinformation and disinformation, safeguarding press freedoms, enhancing institutional resilience, and fostering a governance culture that is participatory, evidence-based, and responsive to citizens’ needs.

CGS is a non-profit, independent institution governed by a nine-member Board of Directors. Mr. Zillur Rahman provides strategic leadership as President of CGS, with Mr. Parvez Karim Abbasi serving as the Executive Director. The Board includes eminent academics, respected civil society figures, and accomplished private-sector leaders, ensuring both intellectual diversity and institutional integrity.

CGS conducts rigorous research, facilitates high-level dialogues, and convenes multi-stakeholder platforms to generate evidence-based insights on democracy, electoral governance, media freedom, national security, political economy, digital transformation, and citizen engagement. A flagship initiative of the Centre is the Bay of Bengal Conversation (BoBC), now widely recognised as the largest privately convened Track II international conference in South Asia. Held annually for over three years, BoBC brings together global thought leaders, senior policymakers, diplomats, scholars, business executives, and civil society actors to examine the region’s most pressing geopolitical and governance challenges. Its scale, diversity, and intellectual depth have positioned BoBC as a unique venue for independent, forward-looking dialogue in South Asia.

Through its research publications, national consultations, international platforms such as BoBC, and public-facing initiatives like Trityo Matra, CGS works to strengthen institutions, broaden civic participation, and promote transparent, accountable, and inclusive governance in Bangladesh.

Notes

1. China, the United States, and India are competing for hard power in Nepal and Bangladesh’s political, economic, and security realms.2 Since its inception, Bangladesh’s government has implemented a foreign policy based on the notion of “friendship to all, malice towards none”—which Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the country’s founding father, ingrained in the 1972 constitution.
3. However, that maxim was shaped by the intellectual legacy of the Non-Aligned Movement, which served as a useful policy during the Cold War. Traditionally, the relations between Bangladesh and India had been on a firmer footing when the Awami League government had been in power (1972-1975 and 1996-2001) and less so during the times of military dictatorships and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) at the helm.4 Since 2009, the Bangladeshi government, under former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, has increasingly relied on Indian support. A significant degree of policy synchronization occurred between Dhaka and New Delhi.
5. The Bangladeshi government sought to create a certain degree of balance and autonomy from its dominant neighbor by joining China’s BRI and courting significant Chinese investment. Notably, both the Indian and Chinese governments, along with new entrant Russia, showed considerable support for the Bangladeshi government after the controversial elections of 2014, 2018, and 2024.
6. In return, critical physical infrastructure investment projects in developing and acquiring ports, bridges, railway networks, electricity supply, and power plants were given to Indian, Chinese, and Russian state-owned and private companies. However, this has only spurred greater competition between India and China to extend or broaden their influence on Bangladesh’s policy makers. Growing pressure from the West on 29 speeches during 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2022.
11. She even issued a series of proposals for the UN compact, “Global Compact on Refugees: A Model for Greater Solidarity and Cooperation.”
12. Widespread international condemnation of the crimes perpetrated by Myanmar’s military—the Tatmadaw—and local militia forces translated into sanctions by Western countries, led by the United States, on key Burmese government officials and army personnel. Meanwhile, multiple attempts to repatriate the Rohingyas have failed. Bangladesh and Myanmar signed the first repatriation deal in November 2017. They signed another agreement in January 2018 to complete the repatriation of all Rohingyas within two years. The failed attempts were followed by the military coup in Myanmar, which led to a complete collapse of meaningful communication between the two neighbouring countries.13 31 and bilateral trade is USD 2 billion.
15. China was understandably unwilling for Bangladesh to court Western—especially U.S.—support to threaten Myanmar’s Junta’s rule in the guise of helping the Rohingya population hosted in Bangladesh. Hence, China repeatedly encouraged the Bangladeshi government not to internationalize the issue and had even offered to mediate talks between Dhaka and Naypyidaw.
16. China, along with Russia, has vetoed UN Security Council resolutions aiming to hold Myanmar to account for its violent campaign against the Rohingyas.
17. However, these efforts have not translated into tangible gains in terms of Rohingya repatriation. India For decades, India has been a prominent economic investor and trading partner for Myanmar. As of 2022, India’s development assistance to Myanmar, which includes infrastructure, amounted to more than USD 1.75 billion. This bilateral partnership includes highly publicized projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, which are crucial for India’s Act East Policy. India has also helmed development projects like schools, roads, and housing along the India-Myanmar border and Rakhine State. Simultaneously, India is also one of the foremost buyers of Myanmar’s vegetables, gems, and timber. In addition to 13 public sector undertakings, several private Indian companies like Century Ply, Tata Motors, and Essar Energy have a notable presence in Myanmar.
18. India also had close security and defense cooperation with the Tatmadaw for quite an extended period. Furthermore, India had been the most enthusiastic supporter of the Awami League regime of Sheikh 32 revisionist actors, including China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
20. This militates against the United States’ objective of denying China ingress into the Indo-Pacific.U.S. legislators passed the U.S. Burma Act in December 2022, which included provisions to provide non-lethal assistance to Myanmar’s ethnic armed organizations and the anti-junta People’s Defense Forces.
21. Apart from imposing targeted sanctions on the military junta, it has worked closely with Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and ASEAN to keep the military regime under pressure. As a part of its strategic objectives, the U.S. government wanted to engage the Hasina government more closely in implementing the Burma Act. However, continuous U.S. criticism of the absence of meaningful elections, violations of human rights, and intimidation of civil society and the media in Bangladesh caused a rift between Dhaka and Washington. 33 support of China, India, and Russia exacerbated difficulties.
24. The ineffectiveness of Western sanctions to dislodge the military regime and the decline in foreign funding for the Rohingyas in Bangladesh made the Bangladeshi government sour on the Western approach. Furthermore, with the United States’ growing criticism of the lack of free and fair elections in Bangladesh, ties between Bangladesh and the United States and other Western nations grew increasingly strained. Conversely, Russia, China, and India lent unconditional support to Bangladesh and criticized perceived Western meddling in internal affairs and the sovereignty of Bangladesh.Bangladesh unequivocally swung to the non-Western bloc and relied on mediation from China, with tacit support from Russia, to engage the Tatmadaw in repatriation talks. India chose to be neutral, mindful of not aggravating the junta and thus imperiling its connectivity project in northeast India. It opted for bandwagoning, following the lead of China to secure concessions and a change in the mindset of the generals in Myanmar. This further strained relations with the West. However, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and full-blown civil war led by the National Unity Government and ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar stalled the Chinese initiative.35 Bangladesh.
31. During dry seasons, Bangladesh receives only a fraction of the 1,200-1,500 cubic feet per second of water it needs and much less compared to the perceived ideal 5,000 cusecs, with levels dropping even below 200-300 cusecs at times.
32. Matters have been made worse by the West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee’s persistent refusal to agree to a water sharing agreement between New Delhi and Dhaka, citing the adverse impact on agrarian communities in West Bengal. Banerjee torpedoed the water sharing agreement that was being finalized between the Singh government in India and Bangladesh in 2011. Her stance has not changed under successive governments of Narendra Modi.33 Faced with increasing disillusionment from India, Hasina turned to China to implement a USD 1 billion Teesta water project. Bangladesh sought USD 725 million from China for the project to ensure better water preservation on the Teesta River. China completed a survey, and Bangladesh began working with the Chinese. Still, construction stopped in 2022 after India raised security concerns about China’s presence less than 100 kilometers from its borders and so close to the Siliguri Corridor.
34. After the 2024 elections, China 37 by experts, academics, and the public.
35. There was a feeling that the Bangladeshi government, led by Hasina, had abandoned national interests at the expense of narrow political and personal ones. The Bangladeshi decision to grant a transport corridor to India to access its northeastern states was seen as an abandonment of a significant bargaining chip without extracting tangible results on Teesta water sharing. The gloomy opinion was further solidified following Hasina’s four-day visit to Beijing in July 2024. Instead of securing China’s expected USD 5 billion assistance package to shore up depleted foreign exchange reserves and stabilize the economy, she was only offered USD 137 million.
36. China’s ire at Bangladesh’s overt alignment with India’s interests was widely discussed in the local print and electronic media, and opposition parties, academics, and retired military personnel were openly critical of Bangladesh’s foreign policy choice. Excessive reliance on India and alienation of China contributed to a decline in the already low public acceptance of the Hasina regime. Public sentiment was that over-reliance on India prevented the Teesta River issue from being solved in Bangladesh’s favor.38 and the European Union to explore new avenues of economic engagement.
41. One of the key concerns of the business lobby was the possibility of trade sanctions imposed by the United States and European Union after the controversial elections in Bangladesh on January 7, 2024.Meanwhile, India and China are important suppliers of raw materials and intermediate products, especially for Bangladesh’s apparel and textile industry. India also remains an essential source of agricultural imports for Bangladesh. In fact, the latter emerged as the top destination of wheat exports from India, having the largest share of more than 54 percent in both volume and value terms in 2020 (Daily Star, 2021). Improved rail and river connectivity has significantly boosted Indian exports to Bangladesh during the COVID-19 pandemic. Bangladesh is also India’s fourth-largest export market and the region’s largest trading partner.40