Actors Mapping and Situation Analysis

As is the case with most of the world, Bangladesh has been hit hard by the Coronavirus pandemic. While official statistics report over 826,622 cases and 13,118 deaths (as of June 13 2021), the veracity of those figures has been called into question. Recent research has indicated that that a significant part of the population of Dhaka, one of the most densely populated cities in the world, could be asymptomatic carriers of Covid-19.Amidst Bangladesh’s COVID-19 troubles, there is a possibility that the country could be increasingly involved as a surrogate in the Sino-Indian rivalry over influence in South Asia. Bangladesh has received many notable privileges from China, such as a loan of nearly USD $1 billion to upgrade its power grid, a tariff waiver on close to eight thousand Bangladeshi exports as well as an accord to build an airport terminal in Sylhet, close to the Indo-Bangladeshi border. All of these developments are intertwined with Bangladesh’s increased cooperation with China on defense matters, which has caused a furor in New Delhi. Prior to the pandemic, Indo-Bangladeshi ties were already tense over the Assam National Register of Citizens (NRC). The NRC in Assam is basically a list of Indian citizens living in the state. The citizens’ register sets out to identify foreign nationals in the state that borders Bangladesh. The Bangladeshi government has stated that laws such as the NRC are an internal matter, but Bangladesh has also asked for written promises that those rendered stateless by the NRC will not be sent to Bangladesh. Statements such as those from Amit Shah, a top ranking leader of India’s governing party, referring to people who illegally entered Assam from Bangladesh as “termites,” have worsened bilateral relations. Bangladeshi Foreign Minister A K Abdul Momen recently said that Indo-Bangladeshi relations are tied by blood, but it is reasonable to ask whether fraying ties between Dhaka and New Delhi will make room for Beijing to gain preeminent status in Bangladesh.The COVID-19 pandemic has added a new layer of complications to Bangladesh’s relations with its neighbors. Both India and China have contributed COVID-related medical assistance to Bangladesh, and India has promised Bangladesh early entry to a vaccine program. Although Dhaka initially responded positively to the Chinese biotech company Sinovac’s request to carry out a COVID-19 vaccine trial in the country, it only endorsed the trial aŌer consulting the Bangladeshi PM on the decision. India’s warnings about the Sinovac vaccine trial seems to have fallen to deaf ears. But the future of the much-discussed trial has become doubƞul aŌer Sinovac asked the Bangladeshi government to cofinance the drive. In the meantime, Bangladesh signed a deal with the Serum Institute of India on November 5 to buy thirty million doses of a potential coronavirus vaccine being produced by British drug maker AstraZeneca.¹ On January 27, 2021, Bangladesh became the 54th country in the world to commence vaccinating its people. On January 3, 2021, the Serum Institute was obliged to stop exporting vaccines due to India’s own state emergency. Since then Bangladesh has vaccinated 5,819,912 people. Bangladesh has also started to search for other sources of vaccines. China already giŌed half a million doses, and Bangladesh is poised to receive critical benefits from both New Delhi and Beijing if it plays its cards right. Switching Bangladesh’s foreign policy to favor of China over India will be no easy or quick task, but it seems that China is determined to dislodge New Delhi’s formidable influence in Dhaka.Located between mainland India and the seven provinces of its Northeastern Region (known as the ‘seven sisters’), with a major sea port on the Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh has always had critical strategic significance to India. The geographic location of Bengal gives it great significance in great power planning. Bangladesh stands at a geopolitical crossroads, and the country needs to make an exit plan to extricate itself from the regional crossfire. The regional geostrategic climate is growing serious. It is no longer just India which has an interest in Bangladesh. Bhutan, China, Nepal, the USA, and even Australia and Japan are showing increasing concern over the country. Bhutan and Nepal, being landlocked, are keen to utilize Bangladesh’s seaports. China is seeking to contain India geopolitically. The USA has recently begun making use India’s base on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and already has an Indian Ocean base of its own on Diego Garcia, but it nonetheless wants to utilize Bangladesh’s Chattogram Seaport to reinforce its position in South Asia. Due to its strategic location on the Bay of Bengal, Chattogram is attractive to all the great powers, especially the United States. Japan and Australia likewise keep up great relations with Bangladesh for their public interest. Australia has an interest in helping to resolve the persistent unrest in the Chattogram Hill Tracks (CHT), where it has a variety of ongoing programs and considerable influence. Bangladesh may once in a while waver between India and China to strengthen its position, but it should not change its strategy towards the western powers. Bangladesh is different from India and Pakistan. It is not a regional power. It does not have the strategic or security importance of Pakistan. Bangladesh has had democratically chosen governments in the past, but like Pakistan, Bangladesh has also experienced military coups. Additionally, some recent events point to the rise of ‘extremist’ activity. The government’s treatment of the country’s main opposition party and civil society raises questions about the condition of human rights and civil rights within the country. For that reason, the EU’s role should also be considered. Based on the economic, political and security environments, there are many grounds on which the EU could get involved in Bangladesh.The European Union is one of Bangladesh’s major business partners. The EU is Bangladesh’s most important source of exports, with Germany alone ranking just behind the United States at 14.2% of Bangladeshi exports.² Bangladesh is the EU’s 34th-largest trade partner.³ The 2013 Rana Plaza tragedy was a critical event in Euro-Bangladeshi trade relations. The accident prompted the European Union to push for workplace security, safety, and labor rights reform in Bangladesh. An example of the European Union’s diplomatic pressure was seen during the January 2014 general election in Bangladesh. The political environment surrounding the election was extremely strained, and the major opposition parties boycotted the election due to concerns over the election’s free and fair nature. The EU, along with the United States, declined to send election observers in order to force the parties to come to an agreement.