The recent terrorist attacks in Austria and France and the suppressed attempted attack in Belgium have stirred up controversy over the security of the Old World with renewed vigor. Out of habit, Russian propagandists actively joined the discussion: they accused the West of lacking a firm hand (like Putin's) and once again predicted "Islamic occupation" , "decline" , "death" and "funeral" for Europe .Expert of the RIAC and the American Middle East Institute (in non-resident status) Anton Mardasov explains why it is impossible to assess the quality of the fight against terrorism only by the number of terrorist attacks, how European terrorist challenges differ from Russian ones, and what prevents European countries from more effectively preventing terrorist attacks.
It would seem elementary to assess the struggle of any authorities against terrorism and the radicalization of Muslims: where there are fewer terrorist attacks and various clashes on religious grounds, it means that there is safer, and counter-terrorism measures are more successful. But doing this oversimplification is like arguing about the benefits of autocracy in achieving political stability. In this regard, European democracies, of course, have their "disadvantages": more freedom of speech and more protected personal boundaries – easier to gather in groups, easier to recruit and, in principle, wider space for public polemics.
Thus, Great Britain, which periodically becomes the epicenter of terrorist attacks, has formally been at risk for a long time. Not only because this country is considered the largest western center of Islamic finance, and the share of Muslims in the total population back in 2011 was 4.8% (2.7 million people). British Wahhabi groups (Egyptian, Syrian, etc.) at one time did not hide their ties with the structure of Osama bin Laden and even recruited local volunteers. And the banned in Russia "Hizbut-Tahrir al-Islami", whose members do not fight with weapons, but in a word, contributes to the growth of extremist sentiments among Muslims and still has the largest branch in Great Britain.
But the "advantages" of such hybrid regimes as in Russia (which combine signs of democracy with authoritarian methods of government) also do not provide security guarantees, as demonstrated by terrorist attacks in recent years, for example, the explosion in the St. Petersburg metro (2017), the massacre in Surgut (2017) or shooting in Kizlyar (2018). And this is despite the broad capabilities of the Russian security officials in terms of surveillance and suppression of dissent, as well as the existence of such de facto institutionalized territories that claim to be the spokesmen for the interests of all Muslims in the federation, such as "state within a state" Chechnya and a republic with its own presidency – Tatarstan.
In the post-Soviet space, legislation on extremism is too vague, which allows federal and regional authorities to "get rid" of objectionable Muslims who have an alternative opinion. As a result, dissenting preachers, journalists, activists, fearing for their lives, migrate to Europe, and at home – often to their surprise – are put on the wanted list .
In addition, not all states, in principle, can use such specifically Russian methods as demonstrative detention of members of most likely long- standing groups or, on the contrary, opening a “corridor” to Turkey and Syria on the eve of the Olympics to everyone who wanted to leave – under the legend of a common attacks on the Salafi jihadist front (followed by tight control of the outflow of people after the event).
The term "Salafi-jihadism" most clearly and unequivocally characterizes the movement of radicals based on the dogma of Salafism, which opposes the currently existing four madhhabs and takes those who disagree with their dogma outside the framework of Islam. They proclaim global armed struggle as the only means of achieving a political goal.
The fear of an ideological vacuum, which the muftiate fed by the authorities cannot fill, affects the general method of banning all suspicious organizations. This saves the Russian leadership from the need to have the buffer mechanisms that Europe is trying to build. As a result, it was established, for example, that the bulk of the Chechens still came to jihad in Syria or Iraq not from the Russian Federation, but from Europe and Turkey, where they left after the first and second Chechen wars or under pressure from the security forces. Among them there are many who were born far from their homeland (their parents moved to Turkey or Europe many years ago as refugees) and were looking for ways to realize their own capabilities.
The well-known researcher Olivier Roy convincingly argued in one of his books that 60% of those who support the armed jihad are second-generation Muslims who have lost contact with their homeland, but have not found themselves in Western communities. Torn from the society of their parents and neighbors, they often fill the vacuum with extremism.
60% of those who support armed jihad are second-generation Muslims who have lost contact with their homeland, but have not found themselves in Western communities
However, of course, not all repatriates in the second and third generations necessarily join the warring groups: some of them were "lucky" to join the Salafi organizations and scientists, who act as a buffer. They take an active stance, use vivid religious rhetoric and convince members of the diaspora not to embark on the path of armed jihad.
Attempts to "domesticate" religion
The security of European countries is negatively affected by their attempt to take Islam under greater control, using often poor terminology. For example, French President Emmanuel Macron is doing this in promoting his bill on "Islamist separatism." In theory, he correctly speaks about the problem of closed societies of migrants, which, having no funds and constant access to services, rally along ethnic lines in poor areas of large cities in France. However, in fact, his legislative proposals, coupled with his statements about the "crisis of Islam" and "the incompatibility of political Islam with world peace" (even if dropped after the terrorist attacks) work against the Elysee Palace.
Firstly, because of the confusion in terms, because the term "Islamist" in the understanding of Muslims has really changed greatly over the past decades. Previously, it had a negative connotation (it meant characterizing the actions of a group of intellectuals who are at war with existing regimes), but today it has become very neutral. At the moment, Islamists run Iran and Turkey, and are also represented by legal political forces with their programs and elected instruments in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. However, not only ordinary people, but also serious politicians, out of habit, include specific Salafi jihadists, like members of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (banned in Russia), as Islamists.
Secondly, due to the fact that the actions of Macron and other Europeans are perceived by Muslims themselves as an attempt to secularize and "regionalize" Islam, which contradicts the construction of the future of the Ummah (an extraterritorial community of Muslims) and Islamic statehood. It is no coincidence that the phrase of ex-President of the Federal Republic of Germany Wulf, who said in 2010 that "Islam belongs to Germany", made a lot of noise. Even then, Berlin tried to apply the initiative to train imams, which has received a second wind today, within the framework of a course, the teaching of which will be conducted exclusively in German and taking into account the realities of the country without any foreign influence.
Colonial past
The growth of extremism and terrorism associated with the activation of radical Muslim movements and organizations in Europe has increased anti-Islamic sentiments, especially after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Extremist actions are often unjustifiably perceived in the West (and not only) as an integral attribute of Muslim civilization. In the 2000s, the famous Islamic scholar Gilles Kepel described a scheme of counterterrorism activities that is still relevant today. Its essence is that if a retaliatory and isolating strike against the Islamists develops according to an unforeseen scenario, multiplying the number of civilian casualties, the trap will slam shut and the third act of tragedy will come – the solidarity of the civilian population with the radicals. In turn, terrorist organizations are doing just that, because they understand well that:
• you need to catch the wave of this or that crisis, on which you can work out a strategy for future actions;
• It is Muslims who often become the first victims of fanatics – in the already, alas, everyday acts of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa, and during such periods the sense of belonging to the Ummah is sharply exacerbated, which manifests itself in the rejection of any harsh initiatives.
However, there are also simpler reasons why certain states are targeted by terrorist attacks more and others less.
First, the colonial past and mistakes that Muslims still cannot forgive Europeans for. During the war of independence of Algeria, according to various estimates, from 500 thousand to one million Algerians died. In the countries of North Africa, laws are still periodically initiated requiring France to apologize.
Secondly, the participation of European states in anti-terrorist operations. Thus, the organizers of the bloody terrorist attacks in Spain in March 2004 set the goal of taking revenge on the country's government for participating in the war in Iraq.
Third, the perception of a number of countries as the center of European life. For example, Belgium is not only one of the former largest colonial powers, which has accumulated many people from northern and central Africa, but also a country that, along with France and Germany, is the basis of the European Union. The headquarters of the European Commission and NATO are located in Brussels, and, therefore, he actively advocates the protection of the existing system of European relations. Simply put, attacks on the Belgians are perceived by the radicals as attacks on the entire European Union.
Borderline state
Macron on November 10 announced the need to give a coordinated response to terrorism and proposed reforming the Schengen area so that 26 European states could compile databases and quickly exchange information. The initiatives of the leader of the Fifth Republic, obviously, only added fuel to the fire.
First, the toxic issue of upgrading the Schengen area or getting out of it, actively played out by right-wing populists in Europe, raises a "nest" of spy scandals connected not only with Russia, but also with the United States. It is precisely because of "information leaks" and wiretapping of political leaders that the channel for exchanging the entire array of data is periodically revised and begins to malfunction. As a result, it becomes possible that the terrorist who staged the Nice massacre on October 29 got to Europe from Tunisia via Italy, and the radical who committed the terrorist attack in Vienna traveled freely between Slovakia and Austria to acquire ammunition and weapons for the attack.
Secondly, the current Schengen agreement allows countries to introduce border controls only in the event of an emergency (like a terrorist attack) and for a short period. The constant strengthening of monitoring within the region will hit hard on the economies of states – due to increased transport costs. In a pandemic, according to European bureaucratic structures, this will result in an annual loss of 5 to 18 billion euros. It is clear that tourism-oriented countries tied to supply chains of raw materials and goods will torpedo such initiatives, and this will affect the overall level of counter-terrorism measures.
Different potential
Finally, when assessing the effectiveness of the fight against terrorism by special services, one should clearly distinguish between terrorist acts committed by the so-called "young wolves" (conditional loners), groups (having some connections with the center or simply sympathizing with Salafi jihadists) and conspiratorial cells.
The current series of attacks in Europe – as scary as it may sound – is simple to execute: knife attacks ("domestic terrorism") and explosions of primitive IEDs can be carried out by any religious fanatics without any careful preparation that could betray their intentions to the special services or even vigilant neighbors. The mechanism of distribution of publications, appeals, text and video instructions by terrorists was invented long ago and was actively used by Al-Qaeda during the period when it relied on the implementation of terrorist acts. It was Al-Qaeda, through the English-language magazine Inspire, in 2010 that distributed articles like “Make a bomb in your mom’s kitchen”, stimulated the “individual terrorism” campaign and coverage of its results through social networks and distribution of messages to regional media. Since 2014, all this, only in a hypertrophied and more dynamic,
However, the explosions at the Brussels airport and subway in 2016 are still an exception. From the "purity" of the execution, it is obvious that these terrorist acts were not behind homegrown fanatics, but the external operations service "Amn al-Kharji" (a structural unit of the IS security service). Although today its capabilities have sharply decreased along with the narrowing of the "caliphate" as a territorial project, it continues to operate in the migrant quarters of large countries, perceiving them as a kind of Syrian-Iraqi borderland dotted with tunnels, where, by the way, one of the strongholds is still located organizations.
Anton Mardasov, Expert of the RIAC and the Middle East Institute (USA, non-resident status).
This article was originally published on The Insider.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.
