The February 2026 parliamentary election in Bangladesh is the first truly important political event after the
collapse of the Sheikh Hasina-led system amid massive public protests and subsequent transition period. The
election allowed political competition and some democratic legitimacy to return to Bangladesh, while
simultaneously revealing several structural trends which will determine the country’s future development:
the rising demands of young demographics, the ongoing tug-of-war between political reform and revenge
politics, and challenges related to Bangladesh's strategic neutrality in a geopolitically polarized environment.
In this context, demography becomes the most powerful political driver of change in Bangladesh. Currently,
almost half of Bangladesh’s population is below 35 years old. The post-liberation political generation, which
grew up amid the 2024 anti-government revolt, had a completely different set of priorities from previous
generations. They cared little about liberation war narratives and heroes; additionally, young Bangladeshis
did not rely heavily on traditional party politics. The post-revolt generation has now entered politics in search
of jobs, accountability, integrity, fighting against corruption, freedom of expression and information, and
better institutional performance.
Bangladesh’s February 2026 election results indicate that although young politicians managed to bring these
issues to public discussion, they still do not dominate parliamentary elections in the country. The opposition
bloc led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and other conservative political organizations won in the
February 2026 parliamentary election. However, the role of the younger generation of politicians and
activists should not be underestimated. This demographic factor brought several issues to public discussion.
For example, the idea of the New Bangladesh is not simply a replacement of one ruling party by another but
a reimagined state with improved governance, better institutions, increased transparency, and a higher level
of responsibility before the people.
Therefore, Bangladesh's future development will depend on the post-electoral government's ability to adapt
to the changes driven by the rising expectations of the younger generation. Because the younger generation
is presently not as concerned with the politics of the liberation war and political rivalries, there is an
opportunity to undertake needed political reform within Bangladesh. The country's political system
traditionally struggles to accept dissidents without sliding into revenge politics. Today, such danger is
becoming more acute considering the growing fear among Bangladeshis that authoritarian practices will
return in a somewhat changed format – mob politics, selectivism, information campaigns, and various
informal means of influence.
Therefore, the future of Bangladesh's democracy will be built on two interrelated factors–the improvement of
political culture and institutional reforms. The democratic transition in Bangladesh cannot be based solely on
regular parliamentary elections. Political stability in the country should be achieved through strengthening
institutional trust, improving administration, strengthening the judicial system, ensuring the rule of law,
implementing fair recruitment, among other reforms. Without these prerequisites, any talk about restoring
democracy would be mere demagogy.
The second critical component of Bangladesh's political situation concerns the economy. The country's
development model will be determined by the difference between constructive and corrosive capital that
Bangladesh is supposed to attract. Constructive capital aims to strengthen institutions, improve governance,
promote transparent economic relations, and create conditions for production growth. Corrosive capital
typically arrives in an opaque, uncontrolled form, creating additional dependencies. This is particularly vital
as the problem of the employment of many young Bangladeshis also deserves attention. If the government
fails to create jobs and improve the quality of education in the country, dissatisfaction with the authorities
will grow. The 2024 generation rebelled precisely because it believed corruption, institutional exclusions,
and similar issues existed.
Bangladesh is placed in a challenging position with its economy, geography, and geopolitics. It is surrounded
by large economies in China and India and dependent on international support for infrastructure and
technological cooperation, particularly from the United States and the Middle East. Furthermore, Bangladesh
is seeking to diversify its international relations by expanding its contacts with Pakistan and other countries.
Thus, the new Bangladeshi government will face several difficult choices with its foreign policy. The country
needs external support for economic modernization, technological innovation, and infrastructure
development. Moreover, Bangladesh does not want to become involved in a geopolitical confrontation
between China and the United States. The international order now even seems to be forcing countries to
choose one side or the other in economic, geopolitical, or technological terms. Trade agreements increasingly
cover regulatory harmonization, digital governance, labor compliance, and security measures. If
implemented effectively, these frameworks can help Bangladesh strengthen state capacity by improving
institutional standards, regulatory efficiency, transparency, and global competitiveness. However, they may
also create pressure on weak institutions if reforms are adopted without sufficient administrative readiness or
domestic safeguards.
In this regard, there are two main axes of Bangladesh's current foreign policy–relations with India and China,
and the Rohingya issue. After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, relations with India have
deteriorated dramatically. There were visa problems, mutual distrust, trade conflicts, and the atmosphere
between the two countries grew more tense and nationalistic. Nevertheless, the two governments realize the
importance of stable bilateral relations and try to overcome political mistrust. However, Bangladesh and
India have issues with water, borders, transit corridors, and other economic problems that still need to be
addressed.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh's rapprochement with China continues to cause anxiety in India and Western
countries. Despite all the problems, Chinese capital is highly appealing due to the financial resources and
technical capabilities available. But Bangladeshis increasingly understand and recognize the dangers of
Chinese capital due to inadequate institutional mechanisms. Therefore, tensions between constructive and
corrosive capital will continue to put stress on both the new government and civil society.
Another big test in this context is Bangladesh's attitude towards the Rohingya refugee crisis in the country
and cooperation with neighboring countries. More than a million Rohingya refugees from Myanmar remain
in Bangladesh. In connection with the ongoing unrest in Myanmar, Bangladesh faces certain difficulties, as it
must work with China, India, ASEAN countries, and the United Nations to provide adequate assistance for
the refugees.
The situation created by the 2026 election in Bangladesh suggests that political change alone does not
automatically lead to state capacity. Bangladesh faces a much more difficult task–to turn mass uprising into
effective functioning institutions while reforming government, growing its economy, and navigating
challenging international relations.
Zillur Rahman is a political analyst and president at the Centre for Governance Studies (CGS) and can be reached at zillur@cgs-bd.com.
This article was originally published on East West Center.
Views in this article are author’s own and do not necessarily reflect CGS policy.
